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New Jersey hospital not liable under state
Consumer Fraud Act
by Thomas O'Connor
In Hampton Hospitalv. Bresan,
672 A.2d 725, (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996), the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
held that the parents of a child who
received psychiatric treatment at
Hampton Hospital ("Hampton")
could not sue Hampton under
provisions of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act ("Act").
Hampton initiated the suit in an
attempt to collect the balance of an
unpaid bill from the defendants,
Joseph and Lynn Bresan
("Bresans"). The bill was for
psychiatric treatment of the Bresans'
suicidal teenage son. The Bresans
filed a counterclaim, maintaining
that Hampton violated the Act
during the course of treatment of
their son.

Hospital denied request
for early discharge
Lawrence Bresan, the defendants'
seventeen-year-old son, attempted
suicide by ingesting a large dose of
sleeping pills in May of 1991.
Lawrence's mother admitted him to
a hospital for treatment. After
physical recovery, Lawrence began
out-patient psychiatric treatment.
During this treatment, his psychiatrist suggested that Lawrence enter a
thirty day in-patient program at
Hampton. Successful completion of
Hampton's program was designed to
last thirty days-if the patient entered
on a voluntary basis and if the
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patient was judged fit to be for
discharge at the end of that period.
The health insurance policy of
Lawrence's mother would cover her
son's stay for up to thirty days, but
she remained responsible for paying
the deductible. The Bresans decided
to admit Lawrence on May 12,
1991.
During the admitting process,
Lawrence and his parents signed a
Voluntary Admission Notice which
included a clause stating that "[aIll
voluntary patients have the right to
request discharge," but reserved the
following clause for the hospital:
"Upon receipt of the notice,
Hampton staff have 48 hours
to assess the patient's condition and make appropriate
plans for discharge or continued treatment. If the patient's
condition so warrants,
Hampton staff may seek
involuntary commitment."
Despite making encouraging
progress at the start of his treatment,
Lawrence decided to terminate the
program after three weeks in order
to spend his birthday at home.
Hampton's policy regarding early
discharge from this program
mandates a written or oral request to
one of the program's staff fortyeight hours in advance of discharge.
Lawrence complied with this rule,
but his request for a discharge was
met with resistance on the part of the

staff. Over the course of the next
twenty-four hours, the staff persuaded Lawrence to withdraw his
request for discharge and continue
the program as scheduled. This
discussion occurred without the
consent or knowledge of the
Bresans. Lawrence was released
thirty days after his admittance to
the in-patient program.
The preceding facts are not
disputed by either party. Hampton's
cause of action arose because the
Bresans did not pay the full amount
owed to the hospital. According to
the Bresans, Hampton coerced
Lawrence into staying the full thirty
days in order to exhaust their
insurance coverage; the Bresans
argued that the hospital staff applied
a revenue maximizing formula to
determine Lawrence's discharge
date. Hampton denied the accusation
and maintained that the hospital
retained Lawrence for thirty days
under the specified duration of the
program. Hampton further contended that it would have discharged
Lawrence early had its diagnosis
deemed an early discharge to be
appropriate.
After unsuccessful attempts to
collect payment, Hampton brought
suit in Cape May County Special
Civil Part. The Bresans successfully
removed the suit to the Law Division and filed a counterclaim,
maintaining that Hampton engaged
in consumer fraud contrary to the
Act. Once in the Law Division,
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Hampton filed a motion for summary judgment against the Bresans'
counterclaim. Hampton contended
that the Act did not cover its services
and, consequently, that the Bresans
had no basis in law for their counterclaim. The motion judge granted
summary judgment in favor of
Hampton, and the court of appeals
affirmed that judgment. The court of
appeals held that the Act did not
cover Hampton's services because
the services provided to Lawrence
were not normal commercial
transactions and because hospitals in
New Jersey are regulated by the
New Jersey Department of Health.

Issue is one of first
impression
The Hampton case was the first
in New Jersey to directly challenge
the applicability of the Act to
medical services. The court took two
steps in its analysis of authorities.
First, the court looked to prior New
Jersey court proceedings for cases
where New Jersey courts had ruled
on the appropriateness of holding
certain professions liable for
sanctions under the Act. The court
drew an analogy between those
professions and the practice of
medicine. The court then looked to
Illinois courts as a source of
persuasive authority for decisions
dealing directly with the appropriateness of a consumer fraud action
covering medical services.
The court examined both the
language of the Act as well as a
series of New Jersey court decisions
to elucidate the definition and intent
of the Act. The court concluded that
the Act is primarily designed to
protect consumers from unlawful
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business practices or advertisements
intended to induce the consumer
purchase of real estate or merchandise. Merchandise includes services
as well as goods.
However, through a series of
decisions, the New Jersey courts had
excluded a number of professional
services from the scope of the Act.
In Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), the
court excluded real estate professionals from coverage and impliedly
exempted attorneys and physicians.
In Vort v. Hollander,607 A.2d 1339
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), the
court explicitly exempted attorneys
from coverage under the Act. In
Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co.,
390 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1978), the court found public
utilities to be covered by the Act, but
the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed that decision in holding that
public utilities are not covered by
the Act.
After Neveroski but prior to the
holding in Vort, the New Jersey
legislature amended the Act to
explicitly include the services of real
estate professionals under its
coverage. The Hampton court noted
that the legislature did not take the
opportunity to include the other
professions mentioned in the
Neveroski decision, e.g., attorneys.
This lack of affirmative inclusion
led the court to conclude that
professionals not specifically
mentioned in the language of the Act
who provided services not normally
considered to be of a commercial
nature were not covered by the Act.
This same reasoning proved
instructive in the Vort court's
analysis and ultimate ruling.
In both Vort and Daaleman, an

independent body regulated the
professions under analysis; therefore, the courts concluded that the
Act did not bind these professions.
Drawing an analogy between the
regulation of attorneys and public
utilities, the court in Hampton noted
that hospitals in New Jersey are also
regulated outside the Act. N. J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:2H-1 mandates that the
only body in charge of supervising
health care services is the New
Jersey Department of Health. This
statute gives the Department of
Health the power to impose remedies in cases where hospitals
violate any of the governing
regulations. The court ultimately
held that medical professions are
exempt from the Act, but it also
looked to Illinois for persuasive
authority specific to the medical
professions.

Illinois decisions prove
persuasive
Because the Hampton case was
the first case in New Jersey to deal
directly with coverage of medical
services by the Act, the court looked
for persuasive authority from other
states. The New Jersey court looked
to Illinois case law in part because
Illinois has a similar Consumer
Fraud Act and in part because the
Illinois courts have decided cases in
which health care providers have
been sued for violations of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. In
Feldstein v. Guinan, 499 N.E.2d 535
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986), an Illinois
appellate court held that the Illinois
Act does not apply to the practice of
medicine. The court in Feldstein,
like the Hampton court, drew a
parallel between the practice of law

Volume 9, number I

and that of medicine. The Feldstein
court looked to a previous case,
Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d
1007 (Ill. 1983), which ruled that the
practice of law was too distinct from
commercial practices to be covered
by the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.
In Evanston Hospitalv. Crane,
627 N.E.2d 29 (111. App. Ct. 1993),
an Illinois appellate court again
denied the application of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act to medical
services, based in part on the Frahm
decision. On the basis of Frahm,the
Evanston Hospitalcourt "found a
distinction between professional
malpractice and the type of commercial misdeeds guarded against by the
Consumer Fraud Act.' This included
the practice of medicine, which the

court found to be outside the scope
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.

Counterdaim
inappropriate
The Hamptoncourt found the
New Jersey and Illinois decisions to
be consistent. The Hampton court
reasoned that precedent existed in
New Jersey to find certain professions as falling outside of the scope
of the Act. The court found that the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act was
quite similar in both intent and
substance to the New Jersey Act and
that there was persuasive authority
in Illinois holding that medical
professionals should be excluded
from coverage under the Act. Based

on these findings, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on the matter of the
Bresans' counterclaim. Thus, the
Bresans' may not sue Hampton
under the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act.
The Bresans also attempted to
file a claim of duress. The Bresans
maintained that they would have
filed it at the appropriate time, e.g.,
with their counterclaim, but for the
trial court's mistakes. The Bresans
claimed that it was the trial court's
duty to inform them that their claim
under the Act was not valid so that
they would have an opportunity to
amend the duress claim. However,
the court ruled that the Bresans' line
of reasoning was "simply without
merit."

Retailer at U.S.-Mexico border loses battle against
Levi Strauss for misrepresentation and lost profits
claims
by HeatherSullivan
In Griffith v. Levi Strauss & Co., 85 E3d 185
(5th Cir. 1996), retailers brought suit against Levi
Strauss & Co. ("Levi") for lost profits resulting from
Levi's failure to inform the retailers that Levis distribution policy forbidding wholesale marketing allowed for
an exception at the U.S.-Mexico border. The retailers
sought recovery on five claims: (1) misrepresentation in
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (2)
breach of duty under Texas contract law; (3) negligent
misrepresentation; (4) violation of the "catch-all"
provision of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act;
and (5) misrepresentation as to the sponsorship, characteristics, or benefits of the goods or services. The district
court dismissed the suit based on the claims of misrepresentation and breach of duty. The appellate court
affirmed the lower court's rulings and rejected the
1997

additional claims raised on appeal.
The appellants, Ken and Renee Griffith ("Griffiths"),
doing business as "Mr. Fashion," were retail merchants
for Levi Strauss & Co. ("Levi"). Levi terminated the
Griffiths' contract when the Griffiths began selling
Levi's product on a wholesale basis. Under the contract,
the Griffiths were bound to Levi's "distribution policy"
which provided that Levi retailers may not sell Levi
products to other resellers. If a Levi retailer transferred
Levi products from an approved to non-approved
location, Levi reserved the right to terminate the
business relationship.
The Griffiths filed a lawsuit against Levi, alleging
that Levi failed to inform them of the distribution
policy's "border exception:' The "border exception"
provided that the standard rule prohibiting wholesale
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